Vision¶
What Nori-zk is¶
Nori-zk is a ZK-powered trustless bridge from Ethereum to Mina. It mints nETH — Nori's bridged ETH — when, and only when, a zero-knowledge proof of Ethereum's own consensus says the underlying ETH was locked. The proof is the only thing with authority to mint. There is no operator vouching, no multisig signing, no oracle attesting. Same ETH, just native on another chain, with the security of Ethereum's validator set inherited wholesale rather than approximated. Today nETH mints on Mina; the same proof model extends to any chain that can verify it — the long-term direction is omnichain ETH, one asset wherever proofs land.
The problem¶
Every bridge has to answer one question: is this ETH real? Almost all of them answer it with trust us. A guardian set signs. A committee of verifiers attests. A handful of multisig holders agree the lock happened. The destination chain mints because a trusted set said so.
That trusted set is the failure mode. Phish a key. Bribe a quorum. Collude a committee. Roughly $2.8B has been drained from bridges along this path — not by breaking cryptography, but by compromising the people standing in front of it. Every new chain a committee-style bridge expands to is another surface to defend, and another reason for the operator's continued honesty and solvency to be load-bearing for everyone holding the asset.
The answer¶
Replace the middleman with a proof. The destination chain doesn't trust an operator, a token, or a multisig — it verifies a zero-knowledge proof of Ethereum's own consensus, the same way it already trusts its own block production. There is no set to corrupt because there is no set. The only way to compromise the mint is to compromise Ethereum itself.
That shift has consequences that propagate through the rest of the system. The peg becomes cryptographic instead of social. The bridge survives the issuer — if Nori vanished, the proofs would still verify and the ETH would still redeem. And adding a new chain stops being a new attack surface; it's the same proof, re-verified somewhere else.
For how this works mechanically — what proof system, what light client, how the proof gets onto Mina — see the Architecture overview.
What this unlocks¶
- A canonical bridged ETH on Mina. nETH is not a wrapper minted by a bridge brand and held together by promises. It is bridged ETH whose supply invariant is enforced by a proof, usable as the ETH on the chain it lands on.
- Trust-minimised cross-chain UX. Lock on Ethereum, mint on Mina, burn to redeem. No operator has to be honest or solvent for users to get their ETH back. Redemption is symmetric and provable.
- ZK-native settlement. Mina is built to verify succinct proofs, so the proof model fits the chain rather than fighting it. The destination chain does what it was designed to do.
- A reach property, not a checklist. Because every new chain re-verifies the same proof rather than being added to a defended set, expanding to a new ecosystem doesn't compound trust assumptions. The hundredth chain is as straightforward as the second.
Where we are¶
The bridge is feature-complete and pre-audit. The end-to-end pipeline — Ethereum consensus proving, SP1-to-Mina proof conversion, and Mina-side verification — is implemented and operating on test networks. The first external security audit is pending; mainnet timing follows the audit and is not announced here. No new feature work is happening in the meantime, only documentation and last-mile hardening.
Read on¶
- Architecture overview — the three components and how data flows from Ethereum to Mina.
- Concepts — the primitives the bridge is built from: Ethereum light clients, the SP1 zkVM, Mina, and proof conversion.
- Components — per-component landing pages for bridge-head, bridge-sdk, and proof-conversion.